Wants to run a command
Allowed · waited 7 min
Denied · Tell it what to do instead…
Free during the beta · Linux & macOS serversFree during the beta
One line on each server and your sessions show up on your phone. When an agent asks, you answer — end-to-end encrypted, through our hub, which can’t read it.One line on each server. When an agent asks, you answer from your phone.
one line · installs in your home · no inbound ports · no VPNLinux & macOS servers
✓ 3 migrations applied.claudeclaude → tmux, on its ownYour agent on build-01 wants to run npm run db:migrate -- --env staging. Your phone gets the request. You allow it with Face ID. The migration runs: 3 migrations applied.
Waiting for you for forty minutes.
It’s 2 a.m. Your agent has been waiting forty minutes for a yes. To give it one, you’d need a VPN, an SSH app and the right tmux pane — on a phone keyboard.
The work is fine. The waiting is the problem.
You answered in 0:04.
01 · Connect
Paste it where your agents run. It installs in your home, only dials out over HTTPS, updates itself and rolls back if an update fails.
claude.New Claude Code sessions show up on their own, inside tmux, so closing your laptop never kills them. Codex, Qwen, Grok and Antigravity too: the ones you already had get wrapped on install, and you install the rest from the app.
Onetty finds the sessions you ran before installing. Resume any of them in tmux, from your phone.
The installer speaks Spanish today; English is coming.
build-01 is in · 2 live · 137 in your history
Live · 2
Recent
No recent activity · 23 projects
Onetty already knows your 137 sessions from the last 6 months. Resume any of them in tmux from your phone.
02 · Answer
A permission or a question sits on its own, on top. Then what finished and what’s still working. The rest can wait. We call it Now.
Read the request before you allow it: the exact command, and every option in plain words.
Notifications on your phone: add the web app to your Home Screen on iPhone (iOS 16.4+), or use Chrome on Android. On Mac, native notifications.
03 · Step in
Allow, deny, reply or interrupt from the card. Or open the session’s tmux, a fresh shell or its files. Closing the app never kills the agent.
04 · Keep the keys
Your devices hold the keys. Our hub has no copy, so it can’t read your sessions — and we can’t let you back in if you lose them all. Save your recovery code.
Real AES-256-GCM with a published demo key — not your traffic. Your own ciphertext: DevTools › Network › WS on /app. This it does see: which server, when and how much.
Each end encrypts what it sends; the hub relays ciphertext; only the other end decrypts.
Your server only dials out. The only listener is on 127.0.0.1, for your agent’s hooks.
Linuxss -tlnp | grep "pid=$(systemctl --user show -p MainPID --value onetty),"macOSlsof -nP -iTCP -sTCP:LISTEN -a -p "$(launchctl list | awk '/app.onetty.serve$/{print $1}')"→ expected: one line on 127.0.0.1
Noise IK, end to end, between your device and your server.
Noise_IK_25519_AESGCM_SHA256
It proves it’s you on this device; it doesn’t sign the specific command yet. It lasts 10 minutes and renews while you use it.
WebAuthn ES256 · your server verifies it
What the hub sees: which device talks to which server, from which IP, when and how much (including the rhythm of your typing in the terminal), and your team list.
What it can’t read: sessions, commands, files, what you type, notification text.
What you don’t have to trust: the hub. It doesn’t hold your session keys; it relays ciphertext.
What you do trust today: our code. Agent updates, not signed yet (how to turn them off), and the web app, which we serve from onetty.app: whoever controls that code could use your browser’s key. The native apps and your servers don’t depend on it.
Today the hub hands your device each server’s key: a hostile hub could pose as a server to you, but it couldn’t read your real sessions. The server’s page in the app shows that key’s fingerprint; soon you’ll be able to compare it with the one the server prints. What if Onetty gets hacked?
/app, DevTools › Network › WS: your session content travels in encrypted binary frames. Only control messages (sign-in, opening and closing a channel, ping) go as text, with no content.onetty agent devices lists the devices that can get in, and onetty agent devices rm <id> revokes one.~/.local/share/onetty/current/app/src/noise.js.With the eyes of the hub on, every piece of session content on this page shows its real AES-256-GCM ciphertext (nonce ‖ ciphertext ‖ tag), made with this published demo key. Here’s the title of the hero’s card, and three lines of Node to decrypt it:
Demo key5423704c442705b6ebdd2d1c271a26ce3201ce1e47845ce303bc45328e47aa0e
Ciphertext89faaf642541e80dd57de77f68910a532529f14675805252c6e1e9905908d44a9e2422db1250d61b91700196a4915fbdd69ebd0d7b32
node -e 'const c=require("crypto"),k=Buffer.from(process.argv[1],"hex"),b=Buffer.from(process.argv[2],"hex");
const d=c.createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm",k,b.subarray(0,12));d.setAuthTag(b.subarray(-16));
console.log(Buffer.concat([d.update(b.subarray(12,-16)),d.final()]).toString())' \
5423704c442705b6ebdd2d1c271a26ce3201ce1e47845ce303bc45328e47aa0e \
89faaf642541e80dd57de77f68910a532529f14675805252c6e1e9905908d44a9e2422db1250d61b91700196a4915fbdd69ebd0d7b32Expected output: → Migrate the payments table
Where they win comes first.
| What | Onetty | Remote Control | Codex Remote | Happy | Paseo | SSH + tmux |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Comes with your plan | free in beta | yes | yes | no free, open source | no free, open source | yes |
| Runs on your headless servers | yes | no | partly (SSH) | no | yes | yes |
| You keep starting agents as usual | yes Claude Code; others with wrap | partly (/rc) | yes | no happy claude | no data | yes |
| Several agents in one list | yes | no | no | yes | yes | partly |
| Real terminal, shells and files | yes | no | no | partly | yes | yes |
| Provider can’t read the content | yes Noise IK end to end. partly verifiable on the web: we serve the web app’s JS from onetty.app; the native apps and your server don’t depend on it. how to check → | no TLS through Anthropic | declared (not audited) | yes | yes relay | yes |
| Approvals checked by your own server | yes WebAuthn | no | no | no | no | no |
| Team list signed by your own devices | yes | no | no | no | no | no |
| Code you can read | partly (the agent is readable JS on your server) | no | no | yes | yes | yes |
wrap/rc)happy claude✓ documented and checkable with open code or by trying it · “partly verifiable” = something you can check, with what · “declared” = the provider says so and there’s nothing to check · — = no
Checked on October 8, 2026 against each product’s docs. If something changed, write to support and we’ll fix it.
05 · Bring your team
Invite with a link, pick their role and their servers, and share a session to view or to use. Every server checks the signature on the list. Your teammates don’t install anything.
List v7 · signed by Alex (iPhone)
applied on 3 of 3 servers
If you only run Claude on the laptop in front of you, Remote Control is great and comes with your plan. Onetty is for agents on servers you’re not sitting at, for more than one agent, for when you don’t want to change how you start them, and for the real terminal, shells and files. Compare →
Which device talks to which server, from which IP, when and how much, plus your team list. It can’t read sessions, commands, files, what you type or notification text. What you can’t verify yourself yet, and what a hostile hub could still do, is in What you trust: today the hub hands your device each server’s key, so a hub that turned hostile could pose as a server to you — but it still couldn’t read your real sessions.
It only tells the hub who you are. It can’t get anyone in: every new device has to be approved by one you already have. GitHub sign-in: not yet.
No. Your agent runs on your server exactly as before, with its own login. Onetty never touches it.
No. Keep typing claude: in new terminals it starts inside tmux on its own. For Codex, Qwen and Grok, run onetty wrap install once. Sessions you started before installing show up in your history; resume any of them in tmux with one tap.
Fair. Read it first: download it, read it, run it, with its sha256 check inside. It writes only under your home, and the token in your shell history works once, for one hour. What it writes and where →
Yes, every 15 minutes, and it rolls back if an update fails. Updates aren’t signed yet, so today you trust our code; here’s how to turn them off.
Your agents keep running; you lose remote access until it’s back. Nothing is lost: sessions live on your server.
Yes, with the web app added to your Home Screen on iPhone (iOS 16.4+), or in Chrome on Android. The native iPhone app is in TestFlight and doesn’t send notifications yet.
Claude Code; Codex, Qwen Code and Grok Build in beta; Gemini CLI and OpenCode soon.
Approving asks for your device’s biometrics or screen lock. If your Linux browser has none, you approve from your phone: the app sets that up right after your server connects.
Not yet. The agent runs as readable JavaScript on your own server, and you can read the exact JavaScript your browser runs.
A hacked hub still can’t read your sessions or sign your member list. Whoever controls onetty.app controls the web app’s code and, today, agent updates. You can limit both: turn off updates, use the native Mac app instead of the web, and remove a device with onetty agent devices rm <id>.
Google tells us who you are. It doesn’t get anyone in: a new device only creates a request that one of your devices has to approve.
Free during the beta. When there’s pricing, we’ll say so here at least 60 days ahead.
3 migrations applied · waited 7 min · answered from iPhone 3 migrations applied · you answered in 0:04
One line. Zero inbound ports. Free during the beta.
$ curl -fsSL https://onetty.app/install.sh | sh -s -- --token •••••• --owner ••••••
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